Accountability for health: a scoping paper for the LGA health commission by Blackman, Tim et al.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Accountability for health: a scoping paper for the LGA
health commission
Other
How to cite:
Blackman, Tim; Wistow, Gerald and Wistow, Jonathan (2008). Accountability for health: a scoping paper for
the LGA health commission. Local Government Association, London, UK.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2008 Local Government Association
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://www.lga.gov.uk/lga/aio/532223
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
accountability for health
a scoping paper for the LGA Health Commission
234LGA health commission
accountability for health
a scoping paper for the LGA Health Commission
accountability for health
a scoping paper for the LGA Health Commission by Tim Blackman, Gerald Wistow
and Jonathan Wistow, Wolfson Research Institute, Durham University
January 2008
 1
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 This paper for the LGA Health Commission aims to scope the main issues surrounding the 
accountability of health services in England in the context of the Commission’s terms of 
reference1. These require the Commission to consider, against a background of what is 
referred to as a ‘new consensus’ about localism, how local councils might work best with 
NHS and other partners to engage local people in decision-making and empower them to 
hold the health care commissioning and delivery system to account.  
 
1.2 In this paper, we seek to clarify the different ways in which accountability has been 
understood and expressed in relation to the NHS, and to offer a framework for assessing 
both current mechanisms and new proposals. The paper is organised into seven parts: 
 
• Part 1 is the introduction. 
• Part 2 explores the historical background to the current debates.  
• Part 3 considers types of accountability. 
• Part 4 considers the new consensus said to support a more localist approach to public 
services. 
• Part 5 reviews current arrangements for accountability  
• Part 6 considers some recent proposals for improving accountability. 
• Part 7 concludes with some points that the Commission may wish to consider in assessing 
options. 
 
2. The influence of history 
 
2.1 Existing patterns of accountability for health reflect historical influences which are deeply 
embedded in current institutions and positions on the issue. The nature and extent of 
accountability in the NHS was a major element in the negotiations which led to its 
creation in 1948. Bevan’s preference for a single national hospital service, administered by 
special purpose appointed bodies, prevailed over Morrison’s defence of municipal 
hospitals and local government control. The case against the latter option included the 
doctors’ opposition and the inappropriateness of local authority boundaries for hospital 
planning.  
 
2.2 Bevan’s argument for national rather than local accountability is generally illustrated by his 
declaration that the sound of a dropped bedpan in an NHS ward should resound in 
Whitehall and Westminster. This position, however, was not a claim for national or 
political control over service delivery. As part of his strategy to secure the doctors’ 
participation in the NHS he promised to provide them with ‘all the facilities, resources, 
apparatus and help I can, and then leave you alone as professional men and women to 
use your skills and judgement without hindrance’ (quoted in Webster, 1998, p. 30). The 
political and administrative state was to stop well outside the consulting room door.   
 
2.3 For more than three decades, the NHS presented the paradox of an expanding 
nationalised service (community services and public health were transferred from local 
government in 1974) based upon minimal central hierarchy. Rhodes (1988) characterised 
governance in the NHS during this era as that of the archetypal ‘professionalised network’ 
                                                 
1 See: http://www.healthcommission.lga.gov.uk/lga/core/page.do?pageId=1. 
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with a labyrinth of professional advisory structures and vetoes entrenched in consensus 
decision making. 
 
2.4 This pattern of weak central control and self regulation through professional networks 
persisted into the 1980s. Annual accountability systems were introduced from 1982, but 
Griffiths’ (1983) view was that a modern day Florence Nightingale wandering the 
corridors of the NHS would be trying to find who was in charge. Despite the 
implementation of his general management recommendations from 1985, a later White 
Paper (DH, 1989) contended that its proposals were intended to introduce for the first 
time ‘a clear and effective chain of management command running from districts … to 
the Secretary of State’.  
 
2.5 Since then, the NHS has experienced attempts to re-mould accountability structures 
through internal markets, reinforced hierarchy centred on national targets, and the 
reintroduction of market mechanisms based on a mixed economy of supply. 
Accountability upwards for at least the last decade has focussed on reducing waiting 
times. Although (or perhaps because) these targets have met with a significant measure 
of success, albeit with some unintended consequences, this most recent period of NHS 
history has been accompanied by calls to end political interference and create an 
‘independent‘ NHS (British Medical Association, 2007; Clougherty, 2007; Glasby, Peck, 
Ham and Dickinson, 2007). 
 
3. Accountability: a multifaceted concept 
 
3.1 Accountability is often regarded to be about ensuring that those who deliver public 
services are answerable to those who either finance or use them (Day and Klein, 1987). 
The reality, however, is more complicated. Accountability is a multifaceted concept and is 
shaped through different kinds of power by particular discourses. These make sense of 
accountability in different ways, implying particular ways of working as logical or 
appropriate (Newman, 2001). To unravel this it is useful to distinguish between five types 
of accountability: 
 
(i) Professional accountability is based on a professional body setting the standards of 
practice that users can expect, and professionals being answerable to their peers for 
their performance against these standards. Although there remain high levels of 
public trust in health professionals, professional accountability in the NHS has been 
challenged by evidence of some large and inefficient variations in clinical practice 
and a number of high profile failings, notably the ‘Bristol babies’ case (Kennedy, 
2001). Clinical practice has, as a result, been brought within the ambit of audit (see 
below) and with an expectation that patients are involved. Increased expectations by 
patients to share in decisions about their care, and from whom they receive care, 
have also challenged the idea that professionals should only be accountable to their 
peers. Nevertheless, expert knowledge is needed if any system of accountability for 
health is to be effective, given both the degree of specialisation and the autonomy 
that professionals still necessarily have. 
 
(ii) Audit is used in this paper in the broad sense of performance assessment for the 
purpose of accountability. The expansion of audit beyond financial scrutiny alone 
has been driven by expectations of greater transparency and a suspicion of 
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‘producer domination’ of public services and organisational choices (Clarke, 2006). 
Auditable information is now required from all public services, forming part of 
comprehensive assessments of performance against standards and targets that are 
published and available for media and public scrutiny.  
 
In England, the Healthcare Commission currently audits the performance of local 
NHS services, with financial scrutiny also undertaken by the Audit Commission. The 
Healthcare Commission’s audits are wide-ranging and include assessing standards 
for working in partnership with local government and for patient and public 
involvement, as well as independent reviews of complaints. Given the need for 
public accountability to be based on clear objectives, audit has an important role in 
one form or another. To date, however, it has been closely related to managerial 
accountability upwards for performance, with national targets enabling comparison 
between organisations and putting poorer performers under pressure to improve. It 
has not, though, been very effective in improving accountability downwards and 
there is evidence that users and the public rarely scrutinise performance data (Smith, 
2005).  
 
Audit has been evolving, with recent attempts to reduce its burden and shift its 
focus, from scaling down data requirements and rationalising inspections - including 
giving ‘earned autonomy’ to highly performing organisations - to developing a 
single local area performance framework for public services called comprehensive 
area assessment (CAA). CAA is meant to be more relevant to local residents by 
focusing on what is identified as important to them about where they live and 
inviting their feedback using a ‘place survey’ (DCLG, 2007a). 
 
(iii) Democratic control in the UK has conventionally meant elected representatives 
holding professional officers to account and having the power to enforce decisions 
for which they are electorally accountable. There are institutional constraints on the 
exercise of this power, including various requirements to consult and judicial and 
central government powers of intervention. Direct democracy such as referenda is 
less common in England than some other countries, although a limited extension of 
direct democracy through strengthening the role of petitions is currently under 
consideration (DCLG, 2007b). 
 
Democratic control has become more complicated with the delegation of decision-
making powers to public bodies, a notable instance being the boards of NHS trusts. 
Primary Care Trusts undertake commissioning of health services for the local 
populations they serve from GPs, NHS provider trusts and other service providers. 
Despite their role in shaping local health service provision, they have no elected 
representation on their boards and their accountability can only be enforced by 
Strategic Health Authorities acting on behalf of the Secretary of State for Health 
(although they are expected to demonstrate how their commissioning decisions 
have been influenced by local consultation2). Some might argue that NHS providers 
that have successfully applied to the Department of Health to become foundation 
trusts have more democratic legitimacy than PCTs because of their ‘mutual society’ 
governance model. In addition, their relative autonomy has been argued as 
undermining integration within the NHS despite possible benefits for organisational 
                                                 
2 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. 
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efficiency and effectiveness (Mohan, 2003). While the expansion of foundation 
trusts from hospitals into primary and community health services might support 
service integration within the NHS, it may also accentuate issues about the 
legitimacy of PCT commissioning decisions that affect them. 
 
Democratic control at different vertical and horizontal levels has the potential for 
conflict between levels, which can all claim democratic legitimacy. This at least partly 
reflects possible differences about the criteria employed to judge policies or actions, 
and the geographical scale at which particular decisions should be made. 
Democratic control cannot be separated from an ongoing dialogue about these 
issues. Ultimately Parliament decides where authority and power reside, but given 
the scale and complexity of the NHS there is a need for clarity that is sometimes 
currently lacking. 
 
(iv) Stakeholding is about horizontal rather than vertical accountability and is based on 
agreements between organisations about common objectives. The concept is 
prominent in locality-based partnership initiatives such as Local Strategic 
Partnerships and is sometimes described as ‘co-governance’ (Johnson and Osborne, 
2003). It has been embedded in the series of recent new or strengthened duties 
placed on local councils and PCTs to assess needs and commission services together 
and share objectives through LAAs. This is still, however, within a wider vertical 
accountability structure in which the authority and power to approve and review 
LAAs lies with Government Offices acting on behalf of central government 
departments. Gillianders and Ahmad (2007) comment on the round one and two 
LAA negotiations that there were ‘deep differences between departments in their 
culture, ways of working, and existing relationships with localities. These variations 
made it hard for local partners, who have very different accountability relationships 
with central government departments, to work together locally’ (p. 755). Where the 
co-governance of local health and social care services has extended beyond multi-
agency partnerships to integrated commissioning teams and a single board, separate 
accountabilities are still legally required to the local council and the PCT, and 
upwards to different ministers. This has meant that tensions can occur regarding 
budgeting in particular; for example, when one organisation is under pressure to 
prioritise balancing its budget over a commitment to a shared priority with its 
partner, especially when this has a financial impact for the partner. 
 
Stakeholding is an important basis for negotiation and agreement, but limited as an 
accountability mechanism. Devolving decision-making to a local partnership body 
does not resolve the issue if there is no clear public accountability (Audit 
Commission, 2005). 
 
(v) Market mechanisms to empower individual consumers of public services have 
developed from establishing commissioning organisations responsible for purchasing 
services on behalf of the public to offering users a choice of service providers and 
individual budgets for purchasing social care. Politically managed markets, designed 
to ensure equity and social justice, are a means of delivering individual-level 
accountability (Le Grand, 2007).   
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3.2 Any system of accountability for health services is likely to need elements of all five types 
of accountability. To add to the complexity, they will also play out in a context of two 
cross-cutting dimensions of governance. The first of these is the level at which authority 
and power are exercised: the individual level in several possible roles as a voter, user, non-
user, purchaser, consultee, activist or complainant; the sub-national level of organisation 
and governance from regions to localities, neighbourhoods and individual organisations; 
and the national level of Government departments, agencies and Parliament (and beyond 
to the European Union and global authorities such as the World Trade Organisation).  
 
3.3 As already noted, potential conflicts between these levels of governance require clarity 
about roles and responsibilities. For example, managers in highly performing hospitals 
may perceive PCTs as restraining their ability to improve services for patients and see 
foundation status, and the possibility of expanding into local primary care services, as 
opportunities to strengthen their position in relation to PCT commissioners (Russell, 
Goddard and Bate, 2007). There is considerable potential for confusion and ineffective 
accountability if authority and power is not clearly defined at each level. Any reform 
aimed at improving accountability therefore needs to offer clarity about authority and 
power, the levels at which they are exercised, and the means by which agreement 
between levels can be negotiated (Wistow, 2006).  
  
3.4 The second dimension is how accountability is constructed on a scale from answerability 
for decisions to enforcement if a decision is found to be at fault. Answerability means that 
those who plan and deliver services are expected to furnish information and explain 
decisions when requested to do so by interested parties. It may be appropriate for 
accountability to stop there. Enforcement, however, takes this further so that 
accountability offers a means of redress. Any system of accountability needs to offer 
answerability but – within a framework of clarity about authority and powers – it will be 
more effective the better the means are to enforce improvements if services fail to meet 
their required standards or objectives. 
 
4. The new localism: local decisions within a framework of national standards 
 
4.1 The argument for a more localist approach to public services reflects a widespread view 
that public services reform needs to move on from a top-down approach (Barber, 2007). 
The initial phase of post-1997 reform involved a large number of national targets or 
‘guarantees’ managed through processes of accountability upwards. This is giving way to 
processes that are meant to be less target-driven from the centre and more locally self-
sustaining, but are introducing added complexity. More devolved decision-making is being 
combined with user and public involvement, more autonomy for higher performance, 
greater transparency, more choice and personalisation, and market mechanisms with 
‘payment by results’ for providers. 
 
4.2 The strategic role of local government in this new approach is cast as one of ‘place 
shaping’ (DCLG, 2006). This includes greater expectations of local authorities influencing 
decisions about health services and driving action to improve health and reduce health 
inequalities. The mechanisms for this include LAAs, joint strategic needs assessments for 
health and social care, joint appointments of senior managers and directors of public 
health, pooled budgets and joint commissioning. Reformed accountability mechanisms 
include a smaller number of national targets and a new outcomes framework for local 
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authorities and their partners, local involvement networks (LINks), and new powers for 
overview and scrutiny committees. PCT duties to ‘involve and consult’ have been 
strengthened and a new duty has been placed on the NHS to cooperate with local 
authorities to support the latter’s lead role in preparing LAAs consistent with local 
expressions of need3.  
 
4.3 Lyons (2007) described this lead role as that of a ‘convenor’, but it is unclear what this 
means in practice for where the power and authority lie to make decisions about health 
and health-related services, to whom decision-makers are answerable, and with what 
consequences for either redress or enforcement. These are key issues as more autonomy 
is devolved to NHS trusts to make managerial and clinical decisions.  
 
4.4 Although the LGA Commission’s terms of reference assert the existence of a consensus 
on extending localism in public services, there is a lack of a full consensus between the 
NHS and local government systems on the purpose of localism. Both are debating the 
desirability of greater local accountability to those who use services and to the wider 
public. However, the new constitution for the NHS that is currently under development is 
driven by a view that ‘the NHS could benefit from greater distance from the day to day 
thrust of the political process’ (Darzi, 2007). By contrast, the new constitutional 
settlement between central and local government contains a commitment ‘to increase 
local democratic accountability of key public services, in particular the police and health 
services …’ (Blears and Milton, 2007). It might be possible to reconcile these two positions 
by regarding the political process as distinct from local democratic accountability. In reality 
it is very difficult to envisage local democratic accountability without a role for a locality’s 
elected representatives in local government and Parliament. Moves to depoliticise 
decision-making in the NHS inevitably raise the question of at what stage and through 
what mechanisms there is accountability to an electorate4. 
 
5. Current mechanisms 
 
5.1 In this section, we identify the current arrangements for accountability for health and 
health services within the framework developed in section 3. Our approach, therefore, is 
to consider these with reference to five categories of accountability - democratic, audit, 
professional, stakeholding and markets – and three levels of governance – individual, sub-
national and national. Figure 1 represents this diagrammatically with examples of some of 
the main mechanisms. Our aim is to provide a framework for more detailed exploration.  
 
5.2 Professional accountability remains a powerful influence on service design and operational 
practice. However, the extent to which professional decision making has been challenged 
by political and managerial accountability structures is at least implicit in the calls for 
greater NHS independence. Gordon Brown’s appointment to ministerial office of Ara 
Darzi, a Professor of Surgery, was also initially interpreted as reassuring clinicians that 
‘instead of having politicians or managers telling the health service what to do, he was 
putting one of their own in charge of mapping out the future’5. Darzi’s interim report 
noted that ‘staff often feel left out of the changes that are happening’. He recognised 
                                                 
3 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. 
4 It might be noted here that in New Zealand, where there are direct elections to two thirds of seats on 
district health boards, most candidates are independents (Ham, 2008a). 
5 John Carvel  ‘Starting from scratch’, The Guardian  Wednesday July 11, 2007 
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that, in some cases, this was because ‘greater power for patients is challenging old ways 
of doing things’. In other cases, however, staff could ‘see that changes need to be made. 
They now need the space to act on this’6. 
 
5.3 Audit. Information in general has a critical role to play in all forms of accountability. 
Performance data gathered and published for audit exercises is of obvious relevance, but 
the exercise of choice and control by individual consumers is also dependent on access to 
information about the availability of supply and disinterested information about personal 
needs and their match with appropriate supply. Some degree of professional knowledge 
is commonly considered necessary to empower individuals to make decisions about their 
own care and hold services to account. The practice and PCT prospectus, information 
about provider services and performance data at the level of facilities and individual 
professionals all have a potential part to play here. In addition to auditing professional 
performance, feedback from patients and the public is an important aspect of assessing 
the performance of commissioners and providers. 
                                                 
6 Lord Darzi, Our NHS, Our Future, DH 2007, p.15 
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Table 1.  Current types of accountability by level of governance 
 
Level of governance Type of 
accountability Individual Sub-national National 
Professional • Duty of care 
• Clinical governance 
• Professional 
appointments to NHS 
boards 
• Professional advisory 
committees 
• Local Medical Committee 
• Clinical governance 
• Royal Colleges and 
other professional, 
regulatory and 
accreditation bodies 
• General Medical 
Committee 
• Independent Review 
Panel 
• Clinical governance 
Audit • Clinical governance 
• Complaints 
• Appeals on 
treatment 
exclusions and 
deregistrations 
• Patient and public 
surveys 
• Health and Audit 
Commission 
performance assessments 
• Comprehensive Area 
Assessments 
• Strategic Health 
Authorities 
• Audit Commission and 
NAO studies 
• National Service 
Frameworks 
• National standards and 
objectives 
• NICE 
• Health and Audit 
Commission reviews 
• National Audit Office 
reviews 
Democratic • General elections 
• Local elections 
• Elections to 
foundation trusts 
• Consultation and 
involvement  
• Local government 
• Overview and scrutiny 
committees 
• LINks 
• MPs 
• Consultation and 
involvement 
• Parliament 
• Parliamentary 
committees 
• Ministerial 
responsibilities  
• Independent Review 
Panel  
Stakeholding • Expert 
patient/expert carer 
programmes 
• Membership of 
foundation trusts 
and social 
enterprises 
• Membership of 
community and 
voluntary 
organisations 
• Local Strategic 
Partnerships, Sustainable 
Community Strategies 
and LAAs (including 
national and local 
targets) 
• Health and well-being 
partnerships 
• Duty of cooperation 
• Section 31 agreements 
• Joint strategic needs 
assessments 
• Working and reference 
groups 
• Health and well-being 
commissioning 
framework 
• Joint outcomes and 
accountability 
framework 
Market • Choice of GP 
• Choose and book 
• Practice prospectus 
• Advocacy and 
decision-making 
support 
• Data on clinical 
performance 
• Practice Prospectus 
• Primary Care Trust 
Prospectus 
• Market management 
• Contracts 
• Market management 
• Standard contracts 
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Three other features of national accountability may be highlighted here: the development 
of National Service Frameworks (NSFs) based on best available evidence and professional 
engagement informing expected standards of practice; the establishment of the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) to provide evidence-based reviews of 
drugs and procedures to inform local commissioning and clinical decision-making 
regarding cost-effectiveness; and the introduction of clinical governance processes to 
oversee the quality of clinical practice. While each of these has had strong professional 
leadership, they each represent mechanisms which in different ways seek to reduce 
variations in practice that cannot be justified by the best available evidence. They are 
therefore mechanisms that seek to make the local NHS accountable for meeting national 
standards of practice and evidence. 
 
5.4 Democratic control. Accountability to individuals is exercised through the ballot box in 
general elections and local elections, the former being the only form of direct, democratic 
accountability in the NHS. It is not uncommon for health matters to become major issues 
at local elections (and more rarely for individuals or groups to be returned on such 
platforms) but local government’s powers relate principally to answerability rather than 
enforcement. Individuals who choose to become members of foundation trusts may stand 
as and vote for governors, though on a substantially smaller franchise.  
 
Despite the lack of elected NHS bodies, electoral accountability is not entirely absent at 
sub-national level. Health and health services form a significant part of constituency 
business and case work for MPs. Without ministerial support, however, MPs’ powers are 
limited to those of answerability rather than enforcement. In principle, democratic 
influences can be exercised indirectly through the community leadership and scrutiny roles 
of local authorities and their formal rights to be consulted about NHS changes. LINks also 
have a potentially important part to play in facilitating patients’ and public voice (Hogg, 
2007). In practice, though, these powers are weak compared with those of top-down 
enforcement to which NHS managers and boards are subject at local and SHA levels, and 
which constitute by far the most powerful form of sub-national accountability for the 
NHS. Local government scrutiny committees are to some extent a means of exercising 
local democratic influence over the NHS, but they have few formal powers to enforce 
recommendations and often few resources to support their inquiries with research and 
evidence (Centre for Public Scrutiny, 2007). 
 
Local residence is no longer a requirement for membership of local NHS boards, and 
boards are not intended to be either representative of the local public or representatives 
of it. The Appointments Commission was established at arms length from ministers to 
‘de-politicise’ the appointments process, though as a non-departmental public body 
ministers remain ultimately responsible for its performance and effectiveness (Cabinet 
Office, 2007). The recent resignations of the chair and non-executive directors of the 
Maidstone and Tunbridge Wells Hospital Trust following 90 deaths from infections also 
demonstrates that Board members who have, rightly or wrongly, lost ministerial 
confidence find it difficult to continue7. 
                                                 
7 Indeed, the chair wrote to the Secretary of State to say that he could only remain in post if he had his 
confidence. The following day, the Secretary of State told the Commons that he had accepted the chair’s 
resignation (Parliamentary Debates 2007, Moore 2007). A further feature of this case is the Opposition’s 
criticism of the Health Secretary for not using his powers to dismiss the whole Board (Carvel 2007). 
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The principle feature of accountability at national level has been the development of 
hierarchical controls based on national targets. While targets are generally seen to have 
been effective in reducing waiting times, it is accepted that they have had some perverse 
effects and should be relaxed within a system focussed more on local accountability.  
 
5.5 Stakeholding. Opportunities for individuals to influence health services and, in limited 
ways, hold them to account exist for ‘active citizens’ in community and voluntary 
associations, whether organised on a patient group or more generic neighbourhood basis. 
Such engagement may relate to commissioning processes or statutory consultations on 
major service changes. They may also be organised to provide self help, mutual support 
and fundraising functions. It is to some extent in recognition of the first two roles that 
expert patient and expert carer programmes have been established to contribute to direct 
patient care and as vehicles for secondary prevention. Their role highlights a further 
dimension of individual engagement in decision making and accountability processes: 
individual patients should expect to be treated with dignity as partners in their assessment 
and care on ethical and effectiveness grounds.  
 
At a sub-national level, various stakeholding mechanisms represent attempts to align or 
otherwise combine the objectives and resources of the NHS, local government and other 
services to meet the needs of populations for which they share responsibility. The history 
of three decades of joint planning and commissioning between health and social care 
agencies is one of repeated re-launches and the re-design of incentives for behavioural 
change, of which the 2006 White Paper was perhaps the most comprehensive and subtle 
(DH 2006)8. There has been more progress with establishing joint processes than 
achieving different outcomes for local populations, and organisational restructuring and 
potentially competing imperatives such as choice of provider have disrupted and 
complicated joint working (McMurray, 2007; Hudson, 2007; Perides, 2007). In addition, 
vertical accountability processes have sometimes given greater emphasis to internal rather 
than partnership objectives and have proved to be too strong for horizontal 
accountabilities to be sustained. 
 
In principle, LSPs, LAAs and Sustainable Community Plans provide a meta framework for 
securing national and local accountability for meeting local health needs within a 
structure of national standards and agreed priorities. The approach has been developed 
incrementally and evaluated independently at each stage. The NHS has been less 
extensively engaged in such developments, and the White Paper Strong and Prosperous 
Communities stated that the new approach would not affect PCT accountabilities to SHAs 
(DCLG 2006). However, some NHS indicators are part of the new local performance 
framework and single indicator set. The challenge will be two fold: first whether SHAs 
and Government Offices are themselves enabled to operate through a process of co-
governance to support the delivery of common objectives rather than perpetuate separate 
and conflicting demands on local agencies; and, second, whether some degree of 
‘independence’ for the NHS as advocated by Darzi (2007) and others (for example 
Edwards 2007) is interpreted as independence from such co-governance processes as well 
as from detailed political control nationally.  
 
                                                 
8 Department of Health, Our Health, Our Care, Our Say, The Stationery Office, London 
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5.6 Market mechanisms. Although often focused on the individual consumer, market 
development and support is also an aspect of accountability at sub-national level. The 
aggregate of individual choices has collective consequences, whether expressed through 
‘choose and book’, practice based commissioning or individual budgets. PCTs are also 
responsible for ensuring the design of care pathways consistent with the results of 
strategic needs analysis. The aggregation of individual choices, if effectively expressed, 
may also de-stabilise existing supply structures and has to be managed. Again, PCTs have 
responsibilities for minimising disruptions to supply, responsibilities which may cut across 
their responsibilities to promote more flexible and less institutionally focussed care 
pathways in line with best evidence and professional practice. These are all decisions that 
could be argued need democratic accountability, and it should be acknowledged that 
democratic processes might well come into conflict with market mechanisms when, for 
example, a local service is no longer regarded by its provider as viable or safe.  
 
6. Current proposals for reform 
 
6.1 There appears to be an appetite among both health professionals and the public for 
health services to be more accountable locally (NHS Alliance et al., 2006). Furthermore, to 
the extent that engagement in social networks and control over one’s life are themselves 
health promoting experiences, then public involvement may be advocated on the grounds 
of personal wellbeing as well as democratic control. Similar arguments may be advanced 
in support of providing choice and control through market mechanisms. However, 
accountability arrangements differ in purpose as well as form, with different implications 
for the interests of different stakeholders. Using the same framework as in the previous 
section, current proposals for reform to improve the accountability of health services can 
also be considered along the dimensions of type of accountability and level of governance 
(see table 2). It is important, though, to note that these types may overlap, with a given 
arrangement having aspects of more than one type of accountability and spanning more 
than one level of governance. 
 
6.2 Professional accountability. At a national level, professional accountability has returned as 
a governance principle for the NHS in proposals that it is run by a professional board with 
much less direct political control and a constitution (British Medical Association, 2007; 
Clougherty, 2007; Glasby, Peck, Ham and Dickinson, 2007). The terms of reference for 
Darzi’s review envisage a shift to a new balance between different forms of 
accountability, requiring him to establish a vision for the next decade ‘which is based less 
on central direction and more on patient control, choice and local accountability and 
which ensures services are responsive to patients and local communities‘9. His interim 
report does not, however, consider direct democratic accountability at local level. Rather, 
it combines patient control and local accountability with clinical leadership. For example, it 
argues the need for ’changing the way we lead change – effective change needs to be 
animated by the needs and preferences of patients, empowered to make their decisions 
count within the NHS; with the response to those patient needs and choices led by 
clinicians, taking account of the best available evidence’.10  
 
Darzi’s principle mechanism for increasing accountability to patients and public is the 
working group of national experts to consider the ‘scope, form and content of an NHS 
                                                 
9 Ibid. p. 9 
10 Ibid. p.16 
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Constitution or settlement’11. The issues identified for consideration by this group are 
primarily internal to the NHS. One is defined as strengthening ‘the opportunity to work in 
partnership with other agencies to improve access and the integration of care’ (although 
no mention of improving health or reducing health inequalities). Another requires the 
group to ‘review the process for NHS appointments, in line with the Governance of Britain 
green paper’. It is notable that no reference is made to the democratic deficit in the NHS 
or the new central/local government concordat (see above). 
 
6.3 Audit. The main proposals for audit relevant to accountability relate to increasing the 
relevance of performance data to local people, partly addressed by Comprehensive Area 
Reviews. CAAs will replace corporate assessments of local councils, joint area reviews and 
annual performance assessments of children and young people’s services. They will focus 
on the LSP and assess performance using a combination of a national indicator set 
(including data from the place survey) and locally-determined performance management 
information. The national indicator set includes some shared health indicators, and more 
shared health priorities can be agreed at local level. The LGA (2006) has argued for a 
more radical shift in audit so that it is primarily driven by objectives derived from local 
public consultation and assessments are mainly based on feedback from users and the 
public. The principle appears accepted by both central and local government that there 
should be, to a greater or lesser extent, a stronger emphasis on what local people regard 
as important, whatever public service is responsible for it. Local accountability will 
therefore need to sit in a partnership body such as the LSP or be exercised through one 
organisation, most obviously the local authority. It has been argued that this could extend 
to formalising the role of local authorities as holding PCTs and other local public services 
to account, possibly including scrutinising or approving appointments to local boards and 
the power to appoint and dismiss chief executives12.  
                                                 
11 Ibid. p. 52 
12 As already proposed by the LGA chair, Sir Simon Milton. 
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Table 2.  Proposed types of accountability by level of governance 
 
Level of governance Type of 
accountability Individual Sub-national National 
Professional • Individual clinicians 
more responsive to 
patient voice 
 • Professional 
NHS board and 
constitution 
Audit • Bigger role for 
patient and public 
surveys and other 
forms of individual 
feedback 
• More meaningful 
performance data for 
patients and public 
• More locally-driven objectives 
and performance assessments 
• More earned autonomy for 
highly performing organisations 
• Fewer national 
targets 
Democratic • Referenda and 
petitions 
• Elections to NHS 
boards 
• Deeper and wider 
consultation and 
involvement  
• Transfer of NHS in whole or 
part to local government 
• Elected NHS boards (whole or 
part) 
• Local government 
representation on NHS boards 
• Local government performance 
assessments of NHS (with 
greater or lesser enforcement) 
• Local government scrutiny or 
approval of NHS appointments 
• Stronger and better-resourced 
overview and scrutiny 
committees 
• More powerful LINks 
• Deeper consultation and 
involvement 
• More strategic 
role for 
parliament and 
ministers 
• NHS 
constitution 
clarifying 
democratic roles 
at each level of 
governance  
Stakeholding • Extension of expert 
patient/expert carer 
programmes 
• Extension of 
foundation trusts and 
social enterprises 
• Joint NHS and local government 
boards and trusts 
• Joint PCT/local council chief 
executives 
• Extension of foundation trusts 
 
Market • Individual budgets 
• Extended choice and 
exit options 
• More guidance, advocacy and 
support 
• More choice of providers 
• Capacity building, especially 
third sector 
• Stronger market 
management 
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6.4 Democratic control. Direct democracy such as referenda could be extended into decision-
making about commissioning priorities. Direct elections to PCT boards are another option, 
either to boards in whole or part, but could fragment relations between local and national 
levels and with local government. A more integrated approach would be for local 
councillors to be represented on PCT boards. This was the situation that existed for their 
equivalent bodies prior to 1990 and is currently the case in Scotland and Wales. We have 
not been able to find evidence that local member representation makes a difference to 
the quality or public accountability of decision-making. It is probably best regarded in 
value rather than evidence terms: it is the principle of local democratic representation that 
is regarded as important in Scotland and Wales (Greer and Rowland, 2007). As 
integration with local government gathers pace in England, there may be an underlying 
momentum towards this approach. Joint council and PCT appointments are now common 
in public health and social services, and Herefordshire has recently pioneered a joint chief 
executive appointment under arrangements to integrate commissioning in a public 
services trust (Taylor, 2007). Under current legislation, the council and PCT must remain 
separate bodies with their different accountabilities, but the trust brings elected members 
into a strategic role in NHS commissioning (there are some similarities with Scottish 
Community Health Partnerships). However, while this model might be able to 
demonstrate better efficiency and outcomes, it does not strengthen local accountability 
beyond stakeholding.   
 
The membership model of foundation trusts has been advocated as improving local 
accountability but also runs the risk of fragmenting governance in the NHS and with 
partners in local government, even though this model may be extended to local 
community health services and has been advocated for PCTs themselves (Rankin, Allen 
and Brooks, 2007). The introduction of foundation hospital trusts and provider initiatives 
such as social enterprises has intensified the issue of accountability for PCTs, as already 
noted. Strengthening the democratic legitimacy locally of both commissioning and 
providing organisations, therefore, needs to be accompanied by clarity about 
responsibilities (a possible role for an NHS constitution, including clarifying democratic 
control from the centre if the NHS continues to be funded from national taxation). 
 
A radical development of these reforms would be to transfer the NHS to local 
government. This proposal includes a range of options from transferring some functions, 
most obviously public health, to transferring all NHS commissioning to local government, 
either with or without responsibility for delivering health services (which would otherwise 
remain with the NHS as a provider organisation). The argument for bringing local health 
planning, funding and commissioning under the control of local councils is set out by 
Glasby, Smith and Dickinson (2006) and includes claims that financial management, 
public involvement and communication are undertaken better by local councils. The main 
counter-arguments are that this could cause further disruptive reorganisation, swamp 
local councils’ other work and intensify local-national tensions about priorities, given that 
it would be impossible for all decisions to be taken locally13. Historically, the main 
objection has been that funding for the NHS is currently raised nationally by central 
government with no local element, which is therefore where accountability should 
primarily lie.  
 
                                                 
13 This also raises the issue of democratic deficit at a regional level, where significant powers are exercised by 
Strategic Health Authorities. 
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6.5 Stakeholding. An alternative to democratising the NHS itself is to increase its horizontal 
accountability to local government as an elected body. This could include strengthening 
the role of local councils in the LAA process and increasing the authority and power of 
overview and scrutiny committees and LINks. Joint boards and trusts, with shared senior 
appointments, could also be regarded as strengthening stakeholding rather than 
democratic control. 
 
Whatever governance arrangements are adopted there are persuasive arguments for 
improving accountability by developing new and sustained ways to involve patients and 
the public as stakeholders, especially moving beyond just representative structures to 
deeper involvement such as in the co-design of services and care pathways (Shah and 
Goss, 2007). More deliberative mechanisms have also been called for, such as citizen’s 
juries and patient participation groups attached to commissioning practices. The 
representativeness of patient and public involvement is an issue that requires attention, 
however, especially making sure there is good ‘outreach’, from using community 
development workers or health trainers to deploying methods such as surveys and 
mystery shoppers.  
 
6.6 Market mechanisms. Some have argued that extending individual budgets into health 
care would democratise the NHS by directly empowering users (Glasby and Duffy, 2007). 
The option is being seriously considered, although currently only for people with long-
term conditions, where it is seen to have potential to achieve the same benefits that have 
been reported for social care of improved efficiency and enhanced user satisfaction and 
outcomes (Gainsbury, 2007). The main concerns about this approach relate to equity. 
Some people’s choices may be poorly informed and the best providers may end up 
choosing who they serve on grounds other than need (Six, 2007). Ham (2008b) has also 
recently argued that it is not choice about individual services that is needed but choice 
between integrated care providers that are incentivised to provide all or most of the care a 
person needs and to avoid hospitalisation.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 The Commission’s terms of reference invite it to consider how local councils may work 
best with NHS and other partners to engage people in decision making and empower 
them to hold commissioning and delivery systems to account. We have identified a range 
of ways in which such engagement and empowerment currently take place and might do 
so in future. In so doing, it has become clear that there is a substantial body of opinion 
favouring a shift in the balance between national and local accountability. There is less 
consensus about the extent to which power should shift towards which interests at local 
level: patients, the wider public, professionals or local government for example. In 
addition, there may be a need for more clarity about how greater independence for the 
NHS sits with the greater interdependence and integration of public services locally, which 
underpins the Lyons concept of place making and other aspects of the Local Government 
and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. 
  
7.2 Among the implications for the Commission of our discussion above, we would 
summarise the following: 
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• The extent of consensus about the implications of ‘new localism’ for the NHS and local 
government is questionable given calls for the NHS to be ‘independent’, with 
accountability primarily to individual patients exercising choice about their care;  
• Although different concepts and forms of accountability compete and collide at different 
levels in the national and local worlds of the NHS and local government, elements of all of 
them are likely to be needed for accountability to be successful and inclusive; 
• The Commission’s recommendations may need to argue for (re)balancing the different 
types of accountability and their associated authority and power (from answerability to 
enforcement) at each level of governance. An NHS constitution could have an important 
role in clarifying these aspects; 
• Different forms of accountability potentially serve different interests. Wherever possible 
these should be made explicit within a framework of checks and balances (offered by the 
different types of accountability themselves). 
 
7.3 There are two final issues to consider. The first is specific to thinking about accountability. 
We have suggested that different degrees of effectiveness in accountability mechanisms 
can be located along the answerability/enforcement continuum. The Commission’s terms 
of reference specifically relate to public engagement and empowering the public to hold 
the NHS to account. If, for example, the NHS is to raise its game in its relationships with 
the public, as the Carruthers report14 has argued, more attention may need to be focussed 
on the enforcement end of the continuum. Darzi’s interim report also comments that 
many local consultations remain inadequate, and one way to improve this would be to 
make much more explicit - and to enforce - when and how patients and the public should 
be consulted. 
 
7.4 Our second concluding point is wider and, in some respects, more fundamental. The 
Governance of Britain Green Paper (July 2007)15 seeks to forge a new relationship 
between citizens and the state that might, in time, lead to a written concordat or 
constitution. The document identifies policing and health as two particular areas in which 
further steps are needed to make services feel more accountable to local communities. 
What, therefore, is the underlying purpose behind extending the influence of patients and 
the public in decision making and accountability processes? How far is it to improve the 
effectiveness of health and health related services, and how far is it to improve 
governance and strengthen democracy more generally? It is important, therefore, to 
locate the debate about accountability in and for health services within a wider 
framework than some discourses traditionally allow.  
 
                                                 
14 Sir Ian Carruthers’ review of major changes in service provision, reported in David Nicholson’s letter to 
NHS chief executives in February 2007. 
15 Secretary of State for Justice, The Governance of Britain, The Stationery Office, London 
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